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We administered an Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ) to several 
outpatient groups--paranoid schizophrenics (n = 32), nonparanoid  
schizophrenics (n = 30), and depressives (n = 30)--as well as to a normal 
comparison group of  community college students (n = 30). Depressives 
evidenced a more pessimistic explanatory style than paranoid and nonparanoid 
schizophrenics and normals. Six months later, among those outpatients 
experiencing hassles, individuals who attributed good events to stable, global, 
and internal causes were functioning somewhat better than those who 
attributed good events to unstable, specific, and external causes. We 
operationalized explanatory 'flexibility" as the range of  scores on the ASQ and 
found that outpatients with larger range scores for bad events (presumably 
showing more flexibility) functioned better than those having smaller range 
scores. 
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According to the reformulation of the learned helplessness model of de- 
pression, causal explanations about bad events influence the deficits that 
may follow in their wake (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Stable 
explanations ("It's going to last forever") lead to more chronic difficulties 
than unstable explanations. Global explanations ("It's going to affect every- 
thing I do") result in more pervasive problems than specific explanations. 
And internal explanations ("It's my doing") result in greater loss of self- 
esteem than external explanations. Individuals who explain bad events in 
a characteristic way are said to have an explanatory style, and a pessimistic 
style--in which bad events are attributed to stable, global, and internal 
causes--has been proposed as a risk factor for helplessness following bad 
events. 
The helplessness reformulation has been investigated most frequently 
with respect to depression, because helplessness deficits are analogous to 
common depressive symptoms (Seligman, 1975). Literally hundreds of stud- 
ies have established a cross-sectional correlation between pessimistic 
explanatory style and the extent of depression (Sweeney, Anderson, & 
Bailey, 1986). However, research into other aspects of the helplessness re- 
formulation has been comparatively meager (Peterson, 1991). The present 
study explored three of these neglected areas. 
First was the model's specificity to depression. According to theory, 
a pessimistic explanatory style should be more closely associated with de- 
pression than it is with other psychological disorders. Relatively few studies 
have compared the explanatory style of individuals with different problems, 
and findings to date are inconsistent, sometimes showing specificity and 
sometimes not (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993). The typical studies 
investigating specificity have compared depressives with individuals suffer- 
ing one or another anxiety disorder. In light of the extensive comorbidity 
of depressive and anxiety disorders (Maser & Cloninger, 1990), such studies 
may be inherently ambiguous. 
A better strategy is to choose a more distinct comparison group, such 
as schizophrenics (cf. Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, Abramson, & Seligman, 
1982). So, in the present research, we compared the explanatory style of 
depressed and schizophrenic outpatients. We also included a group of nor- 
mal  subjects .  Wi th in  the group of sch izophren ic  ou tpa t i en t s ,  we 
distinguished between paranoid and nonparanoid individuals, anticipating 
in light of paranoid grandiosity and/or perceived threat that they might 
differ with respect to the internality vs. externality of their characteristic 
explanations. 
The second neglected area of research the study explored was the 
role of explanatory style in predisposing good or bad adjustment. The help- 
lessness reformulation is explicitly a process model, making claims about 
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psychological processes that unfold over time (Abramson, Metalsky, & Al- 
loy, 1988). But  most  s tudies  invest igat ing the re fo rmula t ion  are 
cross-sectional. A contemporaneous correlation between explanatory style 
and adjustment is consistent with the reformulation but also with other 
possibilities (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). A longitudinal study in which 
explanatory style is measured prior to the outcome of concern is a more 
informative design. 
In the present research, we followed our outpatient subjects for 6 
months, assessing their overall adjustment at the beginning and end of this 
period. Does explanatory style, measured at Time 1, predict adjustment at 
Time 2, over and above initial levels of well-being? This approach has been 
used in several studies investigating the rise and fall of depressive symptoms 
(e.g., Needles & Abramson, 1990), but no one to date has investigated the 
role of explanatory style in the adjustment of schizophrenic individuals. 
Is there reason to think that explanatory style influences the adjust- 
ment of schizophrenics? An extreme interpretation of the helplessness 
model in terms of specificity might lead to the prediction that explanatory 
style pertains only to the well-being of depressed individuals, but this seems 
unreasonable. Helplessness is involved in many forms of complex behavior 
(Peterson et al., 1993), and we can expect explanatory style, as a distal 
influence on helplessness, to be widely pertinent as well. Indeed, helpless- 
ness can be recognized in the schizophrenic individual's passivity, 
diminished sense of control, failure to initiate or engage in appropriate 
instrumental activity, social withdrawal, blunted or flat affect, and so on. 
The helplessness reformulation is a diathesis--stress model, proposing 
that a pessimistic explanatory style is problematic for an individual only 
when bad life events are encountered. Accordingly, we administered to our 
outpatient subjects at Time 2 measures of stressful events during the in- 
tervening months, anticipating that any link between explanatory style and 
adjustment would be most apparent among those subjects who had expe- 
rienced at least some amount of stress. 
The third neglected area this study concerned itself with was influ- 
ences on helplessness other than those stressed in research to date. The 
helplessness reformulation directs the researcher's attention to the stability, 
globality, and internality of causal explanations, but these are not the only 
cognitive variables of potential importance (Peterson, 1991). For example, 
Wortman and Dintzer (1978) and Anderson (1980) have argued that the 
perceived controllability of an event importantly shapes how one reacts to 
it. In the present research, we asked not only about the stability, globality, 
and internality of an event's cause but also about the controllability of the 
event itself. 
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Going further, a question can be raised about the degree to which 
individuals show any sort of explanatory style. Consider that some people 
are more consistent than others in how they explain disparate events (Pe- 
terson, 1991). Is the person who offers different explanations, as opposed 
to similar accounts, more sensitive to the nuances of given situations and 
hence more likely to act in adaptive fashion? 
While an investigation of the veracity of particular causal explanations 
was beyond our abilities, we took a preliminary step in this direction by 
calculating for each of our subjects the range of causal explanations they 
offered for different events. We tentatively identified those individuals with 
a broad range as flexible and those with a narrow range as rigid. In keeping 
with a widespread consensus concerning the harmful effects of rigid think- 
ing, we anticipated that our relatively flexible subjects would fare better 
than their more rigid counterparts (cf. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; 
Ellis, 1973; Homey, 1937; Kogan & Wallach, 1964; Lazarus, 1981; Meichen- 
baum, 1985; Millon, 1981; Moos, 1967, 1968; Patsiokas, Clum, & Luscomb, 
1973; Rogers & Wright, 1975; Ruderman, 1986; Shapiro, 1965; Vaillant, 
1977; Vinoda, 1966). 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Outpatient subjects were recruited by contacting therapists and in- 
forming them of the general requirements  of the study. Therapists 
nominated outpatients who seemed to fit the inclusion criteria and were 
willing to complete several questionnaires. 
At Time 1, there were 124 subjects: 32 paranoid schizophrenics, 30 
nonparanoid schizophrenics, 30 unipolar depressives, and 32 normal adults. 
In each category, exactly half of the subjects were male, half female. The 
clinical subjects were outpatients between the ages of 18 and 60. Most (n 
= 85) were attending a state psychiatric clinic or day program in New York 
City or Westchester County, although some (n = 7) were attending a Vet- 
erans Administration outpatient facility on Long Island. At Time 2, 89 of 
the 92 outpatients (97%) participated. The three outpatients not studied 
at Time 2 were no longer in treatment. 
Only included were outpatients who scored above an estimated IQ 
of 85, as estimated by the Jastak Vocabulary Test (Jastak & Jastak, 1964). 
All subjects had completed two or more years of high school. 
All of the schizophrenic outpatients and half of the depressive out- 
patients had been discharged from a psychiatric hospital within the previous 
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4 years. In these cases, an outpatient was included only if there was agree- 
ment on the general category of diagnosis (i.e., schizophrenia vs. unipolar 
depression) on the admission note to the outpatient clinic and the discharge 
note from the last hospitalization. The remaining depressives had not been 
in a psychiatric hospital during the previous 4 years. For these individuals, 
agreement was required between the last two outpatient diagnoses. 
Therapists of the outpatients had a minimum of a bachelor's degree 
in a mental health field and at least 5 years experience or, alternatively, a 
masters or more advanced degree in a mental health field. 
The Maine Scale of Paranoid and Nonparanoid Schizophrenia was 
used to identify subtype of schizophrenia and to reduce the likelihood of 
misdiagnosis of depression (Magaro, Abrams, & Cantrell, 1981). This in- 
strument consists of two scales, each with five items, one measuring 
paranoid schizophrenia and the other nonparanoid schizophrenia. Each 
item requires a single symptom to be rated by researchers on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Ratings are summed to yield scores for paranoid and non- 
paranoid schizophrenia. 
We examined both inpatient and outpatient medical records from the 
last 4 years in order to complete the Maine Scale. Interrater reliabilities 
were computed by having an experienced psychiatric social worker inde- 
pendently score information gathered and scored by us for 30 randomly 
selected patients. Alpha coefficients of .92 for the paranoid scale and .95 
for the nonparanoid scale were obtained. 
A cutoff score of 12 on the paranoid scale was used to identify para- 
noid schizophrenics, and a cutoff score of 10 on the nonparanoid scale was 
used to identify nonparanoid schizophrenia, with at least a 4-point differ- 
ence between the paranoid and nonparanoid scales required in each case. 
All schizophrenic outpatients met DSM-III criteria for schizophrenia 
and had exhibited symptoms for at least 6 months (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980). Individuals included in the unipolar depressed group 
met DSM-III criteria for either major depressive episode or dysthymic dis- 
order. To assure that individuals in the depressive group were not also 
schizophrenic, a depressive outpatient was only included if his or her Maine 
Scale scores were at or below 7 on the paranoid scale and 6 on the non- 
paranoid scale. Outpatients who had received diagnoses of bipolar disorder 
or schizoaffective disorder were not included. 
The normal comparison subjects were students at LaGuardia and 
Queensborough Community Colleges, generally those attending evening 
classes. An individual was not included in this group if he or she had a 
history of psychiatric hospitalization or a score of 10 or above on the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961). The students were also asked several questions about schizophrenic 
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Table I. Characteristics of the Sample: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) 
Paranoid Nonparanoid 
schizophrenics schizophrenics Depressives Normals 
Age 36.4 (8.7) 34.9 (8.4) 41.8 (9.7) 33.0 (9.1) 
IO 107 (16) 106 (14) 126 (18) 112 (16) 
Yearly income earned 
from employment 915 (1697) 1583 (4927) 9321 (15287) 16753 (12166) 
Years of education 13.0 (1.8) 12.5 (1.6) 14.4 (2.5) 13.3 (1.5) 
% Married 6.3 6.7 26.7 15.6 
symptomatology and any treatment received for psychological problems. 
Several potential subjects were eliminated from the "normal" group be- 
cause such procedures indicated the possible presence of disorder. 
Table I presents the age, estimated IQ, income, education, and mari- 
tal status of our sample. As can be seen, depressives had a higher IQ and 
more education than the other groups. They were also older. The income 
of depressives exceeded that of the schizophrenic groups but was less than 
that of normals. Paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics earned less 
money than normals. 
Procedure 
All subjects attended the Time 1 session. After completing the Jastak 
Vocabulary Test, they filled out the Beck Depression Inventory and a ver- 
sion of the Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ). Subjects then answered 
a questionnaire asking for demographic information. Six months later, out- 
patient subjects attended the Time 2 session, where they were given two 
measures of stress: the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS; Holmes 
& Rahe, 1967) and the Hassles Scale (Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 
1981). Subjects were tested individually, and one of the researchers read 
questionnaires aloud to each subject, who was provided with a copy to read 
simultaneously. Each subject was paid $10 for participation. The therapists 
of the outpatients completed the Global Assessment Scale (GAS; Endicott, 
Spitzer, Fleiss, & Cohen, 1976) at both Time 1 and Time 2. 
Measures 
BDI. The BDI is a self-report instrument consisting of 21 categories 
of symptoms, each a specific manifestation of depression and consisting of 
a graded series of statements reflecting the extent and severity of the symp- 
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tom in question. Scores are summed to yield an overall estimate of the 
extent of depressive symptoms. 
ASQ. The ASQ used in the present research was an expanded version 
of the original questionnaire described by Peterson et al. (1982). Subjects 
were presented with hypothetical events involving themselves, 10 good and 
10 bad. They were asked to imagine each event happening and then to 
provide the "one major cause" of the event. The cause specified was then 
rated on 7-point scales reflecting its stability (vs. instability), globality (vs. 
specificity), and internality (vs. externality). The event itself was rated on 
a 7-point scale according to how helpless it would make the individual feel 
(vs. feeling in control). 
Internal reliabilities as estimated by Cronbach's (1951) alpha coeffi- 
cients were satisfactory. For good events, alphas were .75 for stability, .76 
for globality, .70 for internality, and .92 for helplessness. For bad events, 
the analogous alphas were .85, .85, .72, and .88. Composite explanatory 
style scores were formed separately for good events and bad events by av- 
eraging the relevant ratings for stability, globality, and internality. For the 
good event composite, the alpha coefficient was .85, and for the bad event 
composite, .89. 
Range scores for each dimension were computed by calculating the 
difference between the two most extreme ratings along that dimension. We 
also calculated flexibility in another way: the sum of squared deviations of 
scores around the subject's mean score for a given dimension. In sub- 
sequent analyses, findings were similar for both indices of flexibility, but 
the range scores yielded slightly more robust results. In light of this, as 
well as for simplicity's sake, we preferred the range scores. 
SRRS. The SRRS is a 43-item scale that assesses the occurrence of 
a variety of major life events. The respondent is asked whether each life 
event was experienced in the past 6 months. Each life event is weighted 
according to the amount  of social readjustment it requires. These weighted 
values were summed in our study to provide a measure of overall stress. 
Two items on the SRRS were modified in keeping with inflation over the 
past several decades. The dollar amounts in the items "mortgage over 
$10,000" and "mortgage or loan less than $10,000" were changed to 
$20,000. 
Hassles Scale. The Hassles Scale is part of a larger instrument called 
the Hassles and Uplifts Scale. In contrast to the SRRS, the Hassles Scale 
measures everyday stresses, ranging from minor annoyances to more severe 
difficulties. The Hassles Scale presents the respondent with 117 hassles and 
asks whether each has occurred in the past month or not. If it did, the 
subject rates its severity on a 3-point scale. The scores which we report 
were the cumulated severity ratings. 
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GAS. The GAS was used to measure coping and adjustment. We 
chose this measure because it could be applied to both depressive and 
schizophrenic individuals. The GAS is completed by an individual's thera- 
pist in terms of global functioning during the past week. Scores range from 
1 (= needs constant supervision for several days to prevent hurting self or 
others) to 100 (= superior functioning in a wide range of activities). In- 
termediate ratings are explicitly defined for the therapist, and examples are 
provided. 
RESULTS 
Specificity. Because ANOVAs revealed significant effects of diagnostic 
group for the demographic variables of age, IQ, income, and education, 
an ANCOVA was performed, partialing the effects of these variables from 
the ASQ. However, the pattern of results obtained was essentially the same 
as that obtained with ANOVA, so we present only the ANOVA results. 
Similarly, covarying BDI scores on the ASQ for the three nondepressive 
groups did not substantially change the pattern of results, so we present 
only unadjusted means and findings based on them. 
MANOVA was computed on the eight subscales of the ASQ, reveal- 
ing a highly significant main effect of diagnostic group (F = 3.51, p < 
.0005). The main effect of sex and the interaction of Group × Sex were 
not significant, so we combined results from males and females within each 
diagnostic group. Means of the ASQ dimensions and composites are shown 
in Table II, along with ANOVA results examining the effect of diagnostic 
group. Significant effects were found for seven of the eight subscales of 
the ASQ and for both composites. 
Multiple-comparisons tests using the procedure of least significant 
difference (LSD) were used to contrast the diagnostic groups on the ASQ 
scores. These results are also shown in Table II. Depressives were different 
from the other three groups on most of the measures, particularly for bad 
events. As predicted by the helplessness reformulation, depressives evi- 
denced the most pessimistic explanatory style, offering more stable, global, 
and internal attributions for bad events than either schizophrenics or nor- 
mals. Further, depressives reported more helplessness for bad events than 
did either schizophrenics or normals. 
For good events, the groups did not differ as much. However, de- 
pressives attributed these events to less stable causes than the other groups 
and reported more helplessness. Relative to paranoid schizophrenics and 
normals, depressives attributed good events to less internal causes and had 
lower scores on the composite measure. 
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Table II. Mean Explanatory Style Scores a 
Paranoid Nonpa rano id  
schizophrenics  schizophrenics  Depress ives  Normals  F(3, 116) 
G o o d  events  
Stability 5.13 a 4.99 a 4.52 l' 5.23 a 5.63 b 
Globality 4.67 4.32 4.75 4.86 .13 
Internali ty 5.20 ab 4.78 cd 4.48 c 4.97 ad 5.17 c 
Compos i t e  5.00 ab 4.70 ac 4.59 c 5.02 bd 3.71 d 
Helplessness  2.03 a 1.88 a 3.39 b 2.00 a 19.86 b 
Bad events  
Stability 3.34 a 3,16 a 4.27 b 3.27 a 9.15 b 
Globality 3.40 a 3,17 a 4.62 b 3.41 a 11.16 b 
Internali ty 5.20 a 4.78 a 4.48 b 4.97 a 4.57 c 
Compos i t e  3.48 a 3,44 a 4.45 b 3.48 a 13.57 b 
Helplessness  3.99 a 3,39 b 4.88 c 3.75 ab 10.34 b 
aNote:  Means  in a row with different roman letter superscr ipts  are significantly different (p < 
.05) by least significant difference p rocedure  (see text). Balicized superscr ip ts  (indicating 
footnotes)  refer  to probabili t ies for univariate analyses of  variance. 
bp < .001. 
~p < .01. 
dp < .05. 
For the most part, the schizophrenic groups did not differ from the 
normal comparison group with respect to the ASQ measures. And the two 
schizophrenic groups usually did not differ from one another. However, 
paranoid schizophrenics were more internal for good events than nonpara- 
noid schizophrenics, and they reported more helplessness with respect to 
bad events. 
Explanatory Style and Adjustment. If attributional factors play a role 
in the adjustment of schizophrenics and depressives, then ASQ scores char- 
acteristics at Time 1 should predict level of adjustment at Time 2, above 
and beyond level of adjustment at Time 1. To investigate this, standardized 
residual gain scores on the GAS 5 were calculated to estimate change in 
level of functioning over the 6-month period, and correlations were com- 
puted between these scores and the ASQ measures. In our analyses, we 
partialed out group membership by creating two dummy variables (to ac- 
count for the three diagnostic groups). 
We performed these analyses not only for the total outpatient sample 
but also for subsamples of outpatients who exceeded certain minimum val- 
ues on the scales 6 measuring stress: the SRRS and the Hassles Scale. 
Specifically, we looked at subjects who fell in the top three-quarters of the 
5The outpa t ien t  g roups  did not  differ on  GAS scores at T ime 1 (overall mean  = 48.37). At  
T ime  2, depressives scored higher  (mean  = 54.34) than ei ther paranoid  schizophrenics  (mean  
= 45.81) or  nonpa rano id  schizophrenics (mean  = 46.27). 
6Scores on  the SRRS and the Hassles  Scale did not  correlate with residual gain scores. 
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sample on these measures. There are alternative ways of testing the diathe- 
sis-stress hypothesis, and our decision to look at the top three-quarters 
was somewhat arbitrary. We wished to preserve adequate degrees of free- 
dom, and we saw no reason to create a product term--Explanatory Style 
x Stress--as some researchers have done, because there is no theoretical 
basis for believing that the degree of stress interacts with explanatory style 
to influence adjustment. 
Contrary to the learned helplessness reformulation, few of the ex- 
planatory style scores predicted adjustment. Perceived helplessness for bad 
events was to some degree associated with a worsening Of adjustment, in 
the total outpatient sample (r = -.19, p < .05, one-tailed) but not in the 
subsample of individuals reporting the most hassles or the most major life 
events. The composite score for good events to some degree predicted an 
improving of adjustment in the outpatient sample, but only when analyses 
were confined to the three-quarters of outpatients experiencing the most 
hassles (r = .24, p < .05, one-tailed). So, subjects who explained good 
events with more stable, global, and internal causes tended to improve 
somewhat, whereas subjects who explained good events with unstable, spe- 
cific, and external causes tended to decline somewhat. Explanatory style 
scores were similarly associated with GAS scores in the different outpatient 
groups. 
Flexibility and Adjustment. We carried out similar analyses with our 
measures of explanatory flexibility, additionally partialing out mean ASQ 
scores. Range scores, particularly for bad events, proved to be consistent 
predictors of improved adjustment in the outpatient sample. 7 The compos- 
ite range score for bad events to some degree predicted residual gain scores 
for the total sample (r = .21, p < .05, one-tailed), and more powerfully 
when analyses were limited to subjects scoring in the top three-quarters on 
the Hassles Scale (r = .40, p < .001, one-tailed). In this latter case, range 
scores for all three attributional subscales were significant predictors: sta- 
bility (r = .27, p < .03, one-tailed), globality (r = .35, p < .004, one-tailed), 
and internality (r = .26, p < .03, one-tailed). Outpatients whose attributions 
for bad events showed a greater range--presumably indicating greater flexi- 
b i l i t y - t ended  to improve over 6 months, whereas those with a more 
restricted range tended to decline. Focusing on the subsample of outpa- 
tients scoring highest on the SRRS did not increase the predictive power 
of the flexibility measures. Range scores for good events were not related 
7For the most part, range scores did not differ across the outpatient groups. The only 
statistically significant difference was that depressives had wider ranges than schizophrenics 
for stability of positive events. 
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to adjustment in any of the analyses. Range scores were similarly associated 
with GAS scores in the different outpatient groups. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of this research extend an attributional perspective on psy- 
chopathology in several ways. First, depressives were more likely than 
schizophrenics or normals to invoke stable, global, and internal attributions 
for bad events. The explanatory style of schizophrenics was much the same 
as that of normals. Our results therefore support the reformulated model 
by showing that a pessimistic explanatory style is specific to depression. 
Second, paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics differed on only a 
few of the attributional measures. Paranoid schizophrenics were more in- 
ternal for good events than nonparanoid schizophrenics and more helpless 
with respect to bad events. Both of these differences make sense in light 
of the typical content of paranoid ideation: grandiosity coupled with per- 
ceived threat. 
Third, explanatory style played some role in predisposing adjustment. 
However, it was explanatory style for good events rather than bad events 
that predicted subsequent well-being, and only weakly at that. In any event, 
this finding is at odds with the helplessness reformulation, which stresses 
explanatory style for bad events. As Needles and Abramson (1990) have 
suggested, perhaps the onset of problems is under the sway of explanatory 
style for bad events, whereas recovery is influenced by explanatory style 
for good events. The present data do not allow these possibilities to be 
fully tested. Needed is a longitudinal investigation unlike any undertaken 
to date, in which individuals are studied before, during, and after psycho- 
logical difficulties. 
Fourth, as Anderson (1980) and others have suggested, an individual's 
perceived control over events influenced his or her adjustment. Research 
within the helplessness tradition has tended to neglect perceptions of con- 
trol, despite the importance accorded to them in theory. The present results 
imply that the tendency to see bad events as out of one's control may be 
more important in predicting adjustment than the tendency to offer stable, 
global, and internal explanations for these events. Just what should be sub- 
sumed by the term "explanatory style" deserves further scrutiny. 
Fifth, explanatory flexibility as operationalized in terms of different 
explanations for different events proved to be a consistent predictor of sub- 
sequent adjustment, particularly among those subjects who had experienced 
some degree of recent stress. We speculate that flexibility measured in this 
way may indicate the individual's tendency to take into account situational 
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constraints and influences in offering explanations for events; accordingly, 
the flexible individual is better able to adjust than the rigid individual. 
Said another way, perhaps any explanatory stylempessimistic or op- 
timisticmis less useful than a flexible approach to explaining events (cf. 
Peterson & Bossio, 1991; Seligman, 1991), Previous discussions of explana- 
tory style have suggested that therapy should change an individual's 
characteristic explanations from pessimistic to optimistic (e.g., Seligman, 
1981), but the present results imply that this is too simple a goal. Instead, 
explanations should become more consistent with the evidence that the 
world offers (cf. Beck et al., 1979). 
Small subsample sizes limited the analyses we could do within diag- 
nostic groups, but there was no apparent evidence that explanatory style 
or flexibility was differentially relevant to the adjustment of depressives vs. 
schizophrenics. So, the specificity of a pessimistic explanatory style to de- 
pression seems to refer to mean scores but not correlates. Attributional 
characteristics may well work the same in different groups, implying that 
they are generally important. 
The present research has several limitations that must be acknow- 
ledged. Although we used conservative criteria for assigning individuals to 
diagnostic groups, we did so by relying to a great extent on information 
gleaned from their medical charts. There are obvious pitfalls to this pro- 
cedure, and we worry in particular about the possibility that secondary 
diagnoses somehow confounded the results. Relatedly, due to the recruit- 
ment procedure, we suspect that our sample was not entirely representative 
of schizophrenic and depressive outpatients, being skewed somewhat to- 
ward better-functioning individuals. 
Although previous research has shown that the GAS can be reliable 
(Endicott et al., 1976), its reliability in the present sample is unknown be- 
cause it was completed only by a single rater for each subject. We chose 
this instrument because we wished to have a comparable measure for our 
depressive and schizophrenic subjects, but then decided that only the in- 
dividual's therapist was able to complete it. Further, the ability of the GAS 
to detect the sorts of changes influenced by attributions is not clear, and 
the caution that should always be brought to bear on interpreting "nega- 
tive" results should only be increased. 
In sum, the present research investigated the explanatory tendencies 
of depressive and schizophrenic outpatients. Predictions of the attributional 
reformulation of helplessness theory were partly supported, partly not. 
Nonetheless, the pattern of attributional results was coherent and suggest 
that further investigation, among schizophrenics as well as depressives, 
would be profitable. 
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